Development is guided by multiple norms, and further normativities emerge in development. This should be a commonplace observation -after all, it characterizes the core dialectic of developmental processes -but normativity is instead a perplexing and sometimes desperately ignored aspect of development. I will address some reasons why normativity is so perplexing, reasons that begin with Parmenides, and, therefore, that have a rather long history. Within the framework of that historical and conceptual diagnosis of the problem, I explore a model of the emergence of normativity. Finally, I
Fortunately, Hume's argument is itself unsound. Emergence is possible (Bickhard, 2000b (Bickhard, , 2003b . The false assumption is that the only valid way in which to introduce new terms is via abbreviatory definition. If that were correct, then the Hume inspired argument would be sound. Instead, however, there is implicit definition.
The basic notion of implicit definition is that a set of axioms implicitly defines the class of models that satisfy those axioms. Hume didn't know about implicit definition, but it was powerfully introduced in Hilbert's development of geometry around the turn of the 19 th into the 20 th century. Schlick, Carnap, and others worked with implicit definition, but did not recognize that it rendered Hume's argument unsound. They continued to accept the fundamental split between facts and norms.
Implicit definition blocks the argument because back-translation through the definitions is not possible: implicit definitions do not abbreviate anything constructed out of previously available terms. So new terms can be validly introduced that cannot be reduced to the terms in the premises.
Hume's argument against deriving norms from facts, and, more generally, against any kind of emergence, is unsound. The presumed in-principle barrier to an emergence account of normativity is removed. But that does not provide any model of any such emergence. To defeat the claim that such a model is impossible leaves the task of actually constructing such a model intact. 4 The Emergence of Normativity Normativity, I propose, is derived from a fundamental asymmetry in thermodynamics. In particular, among organizations of process that manifest a temporal stability, we find two fundamentally different kinds. Some process organizations are stable in virtue of their existing in an energy well, such that a change in the organization would require an input of energy to disrupt that organization. So long as sufficient energy for disruption is not encountered, energy well stabilities can remain stable for cosmological time periods -e.g., atoms.
If such energy well organizations are isolated, they simply go to thermodynamic equilibrium and continue in the same organization. There is another class of stable process organizations, however, that are essentially far from thermodynamic equilibrium.
Such processes react very differently if isolated: they must engage in continuous interchange with their environments to maintain their far from equilibrium conditions, and, if isolated, those interchanges cannot proceed. Consequently, the processes go to equilibrium, and the necessarily far from equilibrium processes cease to exist. Stability for such far from equilibrium organizations of process, then, requires environmental interchanges, while stability of energy well organizations of process do not. This is the fundamental asymmetry.
Far from equilibrium processes can be maintained in their far from equilibrium conditions by completely external means -perhaps pumps maintaining a far from equilibrium mixture of chemicals in a vessel of some sort. For my purposes, however, those process organizations that make contributions to their own far from equilibrium stability -that are self maintaining -are central. A canonical example is a candle flame: A candle flame melts wax so that it can percolate up the wick, it vaporizes wax in the wick so that it can burn, it induces convection which brings in oxygen and removes waste. A candle flame is self maintaining in multiple respects.
A candle flame, however, cannot do anything different if conditions change. If it is running out of wax, it cannot detect that nor adjust its processes accordingly. It cannot maintain its condition of being self maintaining across variations in conditions. Some system organizations, however, can do that. They are recursively self maintainingthey maintain the condition of being self-maintaining across variations in their relationships with their environments. A canonical example is that of a bacterium that can swim, and continue swimming if it is heading up a sugar gradient, but will tumble if it finds itself swimming down the sugar gradient (D. Campbell, 1974 Campbell, , 1990 . Swimming is self maintaining, but only if it is oriented toward higher sugar concentrations.
Otherwise, swimming would detract from the bacterium's self maintenance.
There are two kinds of normativity emergent in the bacterium. One is that of biological function: swimming is functional for the bacterium, if it is oriented up a sugar gradient, in the sense that it makes a contribution to the stability, the continued existence, of the far from equilibrium system (Bickhard, 1993 (Bickhard, , 2003b Christensen & Bickhard, 2002) . If it is oriented down a sugar gradient, swimming is dysfunctional. And if the bacterium swims up a saccharin gradient, that too is dysfunctional.
The second kind of normativity is the emergence of a primitive kind of truth value. If the processes in the bacterium select swimming as the activity to engage in, there is a functional presupposition that that is the functional thing to do, that swimming will in fact contribute to far from equilibrium stability. That presupposition will be true under some circumstances, such as being oriented up a sugar gradient, and false under others, such as being oriented up a saccharin gradient.
But truth value is the fundamental normative aspect of representation. The bacterium's swimming inherently presupposes that the current conditions are among those that make swimming a functional activity. We know that one of those kinds of conditions is orientation up a sugar gradient; the bacterium knows nothing of sugar or gradients. Nevertheless, its presuppositions can be true or false, with the conditions for being true being implicit in the chemical and other relationships between the bacterium and its environment. I propose this primitive truth value emergence as the emergence of primitive representation.
More Complex Representation
Primitive it is, however, and, if a claim that this is foundational to all representation is to be sustained, it must be at least indicated how more complex and more familiar sorts of representation might be accounted for on this base. More complex representation involves resources of differentiation and complexity, already present in potentio in this primitive case, that evolution has exploited over time into the possibilities of more familiar sorts of representation.
In the bacterium, detection of a sugar gradient orientation triggers the appropriate interaction. This relation of triggering has two aspects that become differentiated in more complex organisms. A frog, for example, may have several interaction potentialities to deal with at one time -perhaps a fly in one location, another fly in another location, a worm, and the shadow of a hawk approaching. The frog must select which of these to engage in, and, in order for such selection to be possible, they must all in some functional sense be indicated as possibilities available to be selected. The direct triggering relation has become differentiated into an indication of potentiality and a selection among potentialities indicated.
Both aspects are interesting and important, but, for current purposes, the focus is on the indications. First, note that the indications have the same kinds of functional presuppositions, thus truth values, as the triggerings: if selected, they either interactively flow as indicated, or not -they are being indicated as potentialities of interaction between the organism and the environment, and those indications are either true or false.
Second, note that, even when there is no fly in some particular location, the infrastructure is still there in the frog to set up the appropriate indication should the relevant visual scan take place. That is, the conditional relation between engaging in such and such a visual scan and indicating a correspondingly appropriate interactive potentiality is present in the frog even when it is not being used. Such conditional indicative relations of interactive potentiality are crucial to more complex representation. This is "just" Piaget's model of the representation of small objects, translated into the interactive model (Piaget, 1954) . It is possible to steal models from Piaget in this manner because both are models of representation as emergent in action systems.
Piaget's model and the interactive model differ in multiple respects (Bickhard, 1988 Bickhard & Campbell, 1989 ), but they are both pragmatist models in the sense of proceeding from a framework of action systems rather than from a framework of passive input processing.
Piaget's model is also relevant to another challenge to the interactive model:
perhaps it could account for representation of the physical world, but how can it account for representations of abstractions, such as numbers? What is the world that is interacted with in such cases?
A system interacting with the world might have properties that would themselves be worth representing. A heuristic strategy, for example, might organize interactions with "try three times before giving up". Such a strategy would instantiate the property of "three". An interactive system cannot represent itself: the relationship is asymmetric.
But a second level system interacting with the first could very well represent the property "three" in the organizations of the first. Such a reflective second level system, in fact, could represent and transform first level organizations and their properties in potentially powerful ways. Furthermore, a second level system would have properties that could be represented from a third level, and so on. These levels constitute levels of epistemic reflective abstraction, close to, though not identical with, the Piagetian notion (Piaget, 2001) . They are important for many considerations, including that of development, which must honor the sequencing of such levels in its constructions: it is intrinsically impossible to construct an interactive system at level N+1 if there is no system already constructed at level N for the new system to interact with. This is not a causal constraint, from the environment or from the genes: it is intrinsic in the ontology of the levels. however, continue to serve the more general function of interaction selection.
5 I am not elaborating in this chapter the multiple and wide ranging arguments against alternative models of representation (Bickhard, 1993 (Bickhard, , 2003b . If those are taken into account, then the interactive model is the only remaining viable model of representation.
In this model, cognition and motivation develop together. New motivations that are crucial to learning and development are themselves emergent in this co-evolution of cognition and motivation. They emerge out of the interplay of cognition, learning, and emotion. Motivations like curiosity are not distinct innate modules; they are inherent in human forms of the emotional influences on motivation with respect to cognitive and interactive phenomena. New normativities emerge from the historistic developmental and interactive interplay of already extant normativities.
Values
In a system interacting with its environment, some interactions will be organized around satisfying the conditions detected (or represented) by other interactions. In particular, the detections or representations (detection does not require representation:
they hypothalamus may detect low blood sugar, but it doesn't represent it) will function as set-points or goals for other interactions. This can hold for interacting per se, as when obtaining an ice cream cone is the goal, but also for learning, as when an input flow is encountered that the organism does not know how to interact with. Such novelty will evoke emotional reactions and learning attempts to try to successfully interact with the situation.
A similar point holds for higher levels of interactive knowing, except that the detections and representations are about lower level process and organizations, not about the external environment. Higher level "goals" of this sort, whether evoking interactions per se or learning or emotions, constitute values. In organizing interaction and learning and emotion, values are motivating, inherently so. I would like to address a few
properties of values as they function in development.
The Unfolding of Values
Higher level values can constrain lower level activities and constructions, but lower level organization impose an interesting constraint on the construction of higher level values. Values will be constructed to interact with, to represent, aspects and properties that are already instantiated, and, thus, available for interaction, in lower levels. That is, the construction of values will unfold values that are already implicit in lower level organization and process. This constraint, however, is not a full determination because there may be multiple values that might be unfolded.
Once a higher level value is constructed, however, it serves not only to constrain further lower level activity, it also serves to make explicit some aspect of what was before only implicit. A value may be satisfied by the organization from which it unfolded, but, once explicit, may be found to contradict some other aspect of lower level functioning. Or two higher level values may contradict each other. The value of being the toughest kid on the playground may not fit well with the value of being liked.
Values will always lead development in this sense of being unfolded into explicitness, constraining further activities and constructions, and making implicit conflicts explicit. Values are the leading edge -the leading normative edge -of development. They give direction to development, and their conflicts both force further development and, potentially, inhibit it. Values are motivating in both the interactive sense and the learning sense, and their satisfaction, or lack thereof, is an emotional issue -satisfaction is a kind of successful interaction, and failure of satisfaction is failure of interaction.
Self Referential Values
There is one special kind of value that I would like to elaborate a little further.
Values that refer to the whole person, not just to one or more lower levels, can induce a particular kind of difficulty. A value about how the entire person should be in the world is a value about how the entire person should be spontaneously. But to take such a value as something to be approached instrumentally is to create a self-imposed double bind. It is to give oneself the command to be spontaneous (in a certain way). There is no way to obey such a command -to obey it is to be not spontaneous. So, I cannot decide to be at peace in the world, or to feel kindly toward others, and instrumentally adopt appropriate strategies that succeed in doing so. Any such strategies will be adopted by myself, and, thus, will not be the spontaneous actions of my whole self. Instead, my central spontaneous activity will be to be concerned about obeying the command of this value, which is not the same as living the value in itself.
On the other hand, it is certainly possible to cultivate the development of ways of being in the world, so such a value, even though a trap if taken as something to be approached strictly instrumentally, may well serve as a useful guidance for kinds of activities to seek out and kinds of reflections to engage in. Particular versions of selfreferential assumptions about oneself, however, can be especially difficult to deal with in any way, and can constrain the development of rigid pathologies (Bickhard, 1989, in preparation) . Normativity saturates all of development. There is no possibility of understanding development without understanding the normativities and the normative emergences involved. Yet normativity is today still suffering the consequences of a bad metaphysics, a metaphysical framework that makes issues of normativity seem unscientific, even mystical. But science addresses the world as it is, and the world of development, of mind and person more broadly, is normative through and through. It is normative in its basic ontology. Science must ultimately address these issues of normativity, but will not be able to do so until it has abandoned the Parmenidean, Empedoclean, Aristotelian, heritage that sets all matters normative aside and outside of the natural world.
Intrinsic Motivational Values

